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As the seventh year of economic expansion draws to a 
close, inflation fears seem to have subsided. But in 
recent months some signs of rising inflation and 
slowing growth have emerged. These signs have caused 
many economists to predict that inflation will be higher 
and real growth slower in 1990 than they were in 1989. 
In contrast, a model used by researchers at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis suggests that those 
forecasters' predictions are too pessimistic. The model 
predicts that strong consumption growth will sustain 
the expansion in both 1990 and 1991 and that inflation 
will remain under control. 
Still Walking a Fine Line? 
In a Quarterly Review article published early in 1989, 
Preston Miller and I argued that the economy had to 
walk a fine line between recession and accelerating 
inflation (Miller and Runkle 1989). We suggested that 
real output in 19 89 could not grow much faster than 3.1 
percent without an increase in inflation. At the time, the 
Minneapolis Fed's Bayesian vector autoregression 
(BVAR) model of the U.S. economy predicted moderate 
real growth and moderate inflation for 1989. The 
model's predictions were largely correct: It now looks 
as if real gross national product (GNP, adjusted for 
inflation) will grow by about 2.4 percent and inflation, 
as measured by the GNP deflator, will be 3.9 percent. 
These numbers seem to indicate that the economy has 
managed to walk a fine line in 1989. 
Since the middle of 1989, however, there have been 
some signs that the economy may be weakening. 
Employment in manufacturing has declined steadily 
during the last half of 1989. Between the beginning of 
June and the end of December, nearly 200,000 manu-
facturing jobs are likely to be lost. New sales of 
domestically produced autos in October and November 
fell to an annual rate of 6 million units—their lowest 
level in six years for any two consecutive months. As a 
result of these signs, many economists are predicting a 
decline in real consumer spending during the fourth 
quarter of 1989. There has also been a recent decline in 
new orders for manufactured goods, one indicator of 
future economic activity. 
At the same time that real growth appears to be 
slowing, some data on price changes suggest that the 
low inflation during the third quarter of 1989 was an 
aberration and that inflation may rise in 1990. In 
October, both the consumer price index (CPI) and the 
producer price index rose at annual rates of more than 5 
percent after four months of slow growth. These rising 
rates have cast some doubt on the claim that inflation is 
finally under control and have caused some analysts to 
revert to their pessimistic inflation forecasts made early 
in 1989. 
The recent data suggest that we must reconsider 
whether or not the economy will continue to walk a fine 
line between recession and accelerating inflation in 
1990-91. 
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19 The Current Consensus ... 
Although most economists now predict that inflation 
will not accelerate dramatically and that the economy 
will not enter a recession, the consensus among them is 
that inflation will be higher and real growth will be 
lower in 1990 than in 1989. The September 1989 
Business Outlook Survey of professional forecasters, 
conducted by the American Statistical Association 
(ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), shows that the forecasters' median prediction 
calls for the GNP deflator to rise by 4.4 percent from the 
fourth quarter of 1989 until the fourth quarter of 1990.
1 
This prediction is half a percentage point higher than 
the BV AR model's current estimates of deflator growth 
in 1989. The ASA-NBER forecasters also believe real 
growth will slow slightly in 1990. Their median fore-
cast is that real GNP will grow by only 2.1 percent 
during 1990, or three-tenths of a percentage point 
lower than the model's current estimates of real growth 
in 1989. 
The main reason for this pessimism among the 
A BVAR Model's Forecast for the U.S. Economy in 1990-91* 
ASA-NBER forecasters seems to be a belief that the 
recent low inflation in the third quarter of 1989 was an 
aberration whereas the current weakness in consumer 
spending will continue into 1990. The median forecast 
in the ASA-NBER survey is that real consumption will 
grow by only 2.5 percent in 1990. In comparison, 
annual consumption growth has averaged 3.8 percent 
since 1983, when the recovery was under way. 
... Contradicted 
Although many economists believe that real growth 
will slow in 1990, the Minneapolis Fed's national 
BVAR model predicts faster growth with moderate 
inflation. (See Litterman 1984 and Todd 1984 for 
^ee NBER 1989. The ASA-NBER survey, which was started in 1968, is 
the longest continuous survey of GNP predictions made by business econo-
mists. For more background on the survey, see Keane and Runkle 1989 and 
Zarnowitz 1969.1 use the median ASA-NBER forecast instead of the better-
known Blue Chip consensus forecast because the Blue Chip survey does not ask 
forecasters to predict consumption growth, whereas the ASA-NBER survey 
does. 
Actual** Model Forecast 1948_88 
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 Average 
Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross National Product 2.4% 3.4% 3.8% 3.3% 
Consumer Spending  2.4  4.0  3.8  3.4 
Durable Goods  -1.1  8.5  5.1  5.1 
Nondurable Goods and Services  3.1  3.2  3.5  3.2 
Investment  2.0  2.5  5.6  4.3 
Business Fixed  4.3  3.4  5.7  3.4 
Residential  -6.0  5.6  2.9  3.6 
Government Purchases  1.0  1.7  0.8  4.1 
Gross National Product Deflator 3.9% 3.1% 2.9% 4.2% 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories 23.1 bil. 13.1 bil. 18.9 bil. 13.5 bil. 
(1982 $) 
Net Exports (1982 $) -60.1 bil. -58.6 bil. -50.8 bil. -18.6 bil. 
(Exports less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 5.3% 5.4% 5.4% 5.7% 
(Unemployment as a % of the Civilian Labor Force) 
*This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available on November 30,1989. 
"Actual numbers are based on data for the first three quarters of 1989 and the BVAR model's forecast for the fourth quarter of 1989 
(using data available on November 30,1989). 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
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background information on BVAR models like this 
one.) The model's forecast for 1990 and 1991 is 
summarized in the accompanying table. The model 
predicts that the current weakness in growth will be 
reversed early in 1990. It predicts that real GNP will 
increase by 3.4 percent from the fourth quarter of 1989 
until the fourth quarter of 1990 and by 3.8 percent 
between then and the fourth quarter of 1991. The 
model also predicts that the GNP deflator will increase 
by only 3.1 percent in 1990 and by 2.9 percent in 1991. 
The model's strong forecast for real consumption 
growth is the main reason its prediction for real growth 
in 1990 is so much stronger than the forecasts of many 
business economists. The model predicts that real con-
sumer spending will increase by 4 percent in 1990— 
almost twice the rate of growth predicted by the median 
forecast in the ASA-NBER survey. (See Chart 1.) This 
difference in consumption growth predictions accounts 
for more than 90 percent of the difference between the 
model's GNP growth forecast for 1990 and that of the 
median ASA-NBER forecast. 
Because the model forecasts that the moderate 
inflation between May and September of 1989 is likely 
to persist, its inflation predictions are more optimistic 
than those of the median ASA-NBER forecast. Using 
data on inflation through October 1989, the model 
predicts that during the second half of 1989 the GNP 
deflator will grow at an annual rate of 3.6 percent and 
that the CPI will grow at an annual rate of 3.1 percent. 
The model's predictions for low inflation in 1990 and 
1991 are extrapolations of those low inflation rates, 
nudged downward by recent drops in interest rates. 
(Whenever interest rates fall, the model predicts that 
inflation will fall, too. The model makes this prediction 
because in the past, falling interest rates have been 
followed, on average, by falling inflation.) 
Which Forecast Seems More Likely? 
Although the model's forecasts for both inflation and 
real growth are more optimistic than the median ASA-
NBER forecast, the outlook for real growth seems to be 
the focus for most current discussions of economic 
policy. Since the model's forecast takes a much more 
optimistic view of the effect of current economic 
weakness on future real growth than does the median 
ASA-NBER forecast, we need to determine which of 
these predictions is more likely. 
There are four kinds of evidence that support the 
BVAR model's predictions: 
• Current data on factors affecting future consump-
tion. 
Chart 1 
Differences in Consumption Growth Forecasts for 1990 
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*The 1989 data are actual—except for the fourth quarter. 
Source of actual data: U.S. Department of Commerce 
• Historical data about what has happened after slow-
downs during the current recovery and expansion. 
• An evaluation of the internal consistency of the 
median ASA-NBER forecast. 
• A comparison of the recent accuracy of forecasts 
made by the BVAR model and the median ASA-
NBER forecast. 
Data Affecting Future Consumption 
Although forecasters generally agree that consumption 
growth will be weak in the fourth quarter of 1989, they 
disagree about how quickly consumption growth will 
return to its previous rates. The effects of Hurricane 
Hugo, the San Francisco earthquake, and the newly 
resolved Boeing strike have added to the confusion in 
interpreting fourth-quarter data. But several indicators 
suggest that consumption should remain strong. 
One of these indicators is the Conference Board's 
Consumer Confidence Index, which has been published 
since 1978. The index is currently at near-record levels 
(see Chart 2). Only in four previous years (1983,1984, 
1987, and 1988) has the index averaged over 100 
during the final two months of a year. The years with 
high year-end consumer confidence were followed by 
years with, on average, 3.7 percent real consumption 
21 Chart 2 
Consumers Have the Confidence to Spend ... 
Consumer Confidence Index 
Quarterly, 1978:1-1989:3 
Index: 1985=100 
Source: Conference Board 
growth. Since, as of October 1989, the index was 116.4, 
high consumption growth next year seems likely.
2 
The optimism suggested by the Consumer Confi-
dence Index is reinforced by recent data that confirm 
consumers' ability to spend. Real disposable income 
has increased by 4 percent since the fourth quarter of 
1988—its sixth fastest growth rate during the past two 
decades. Real disposable income per capita is at record 
levels (see Chart 3). Real net worth per household is 
also at a record high (see Chart 4). These data show that 
people have income to spend and money in the bank— 
hardly indicators of slow consumption growth. 
The strength in consumption growth during the first 
three quarters of 1989 offers additional support for the 
prediction that consumption growth will rebound soon. 
(See Chart 1 again.) During the first three quarters, real 
consumption grew at an annual rate of 3.4 percent. 
In the third quarter, growth was particularly strong, at 
6.2 percent. 
Some analysts have claimed that rapid new car sales 
caused most of the strength in consumption during the 
third quarter and that the fourth-quarter weakness in 
auto sales indicates weak total consumption for 1990. 
2 Another index, the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment, does not show 
the same rapid rise after 1987 that the Conference Board's index shows. Even 
so, the level of the Michigan index in October 1989 was still above its average 
since 1983. 
But these analysts have ignored the recent strength in 
consumption of nondurable goods and services, which 
make up 84 percent of total consumption. Even though 
durable-goods consumption grew at an annual rate of 
13.2 percent in the third quarter, increases in spending 
for nondurable goods and services actually accounted 
for two-thirds of the growth in real consumption in that 
quarter. Strong growth in the consumption of non-
durable goods and services has occurred throughout the 
first three quarters of 1989. During that time, real 
Charts 3 and 4 
... And the Ability 
Chart 3 Real Disposable Income Per Capita 
Quarterly, 1978:1-1989:3 
Thou, of 1982 $ 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
Chart 4 Real Net Worth Per Household 
Annual, 1978-1989* 
i • i i i i i i i i i 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 
'Amounts are fourth-quarter levels—except for that in 1989, 
which is the second-quarter level. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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consumption of nondurable goods and services grew at 
an annual rate of 2.9 percent. If this consumption 
continued to grow at that rate in 1990, then even with 
zero growth in durable-goods consumption, total con-
sumption would grow by at least 2.5 percent. This fact 
suggests that the pessimism of the median ASA-NBER 
forecast may be unwarranted. 
Historical Evidence 
Another source of support for the BVAR model's 
forecast of strong growth for 1990 is historical evidence 
of the economy's resiliency since the current recovery 
began in 1982. Analysts have cited three pieces of data 
to suggest that the economy is now slowing: First, 
durable-goods consumption has declined; second, em-
ployment in manufacturing has fallen; third, the real 
value of new orders has dropped. Each of these events 
has happened before in the current expansion, yet none 
had any sustained effect on the expansion. 
Most analysts expect that consumption of durable 
goods will fall sharply during the fourth quarter of 
1989. Even the BVAR model predicts this decline. But 
many analysts are making dour predictions that this 
drop in durable-goods consumption will continue into 
1990. The evidence from the current expansion, how-
ever, suggests that a sharp fall in durable-goods 
consumption during one quarter need not continue into 
subsequent quarters. In three quarters of the current 
recovery (1985:4,1987:1, and 1987:4), real consump-
tion of durable goods has declined at an annual rate of 
more than 13 percent in a single quarter. New car sales 
fell sharply in each of those quarters after sales incen-
tives and costlier-than-usual advertising campaigns 
were curtailed. In each case, consumption growth 
during the next two quarters exceeded a 10 percent 
annual rate. Based on these precedents, the fourth-
quarter weakness in durable-goods consumption does 
not necessarily mean that the weakness will continue 
into 1990, although continued weakness is certainly 
possible. 
Evidence from the current expansion also suggests 
that neither a decline in manufacturing employment 
nor a drop in the real value of new orders for manu-
factured goods need result in slow growth. For instance, 
both manufacturing employment and new orders de-
clined in every quarter of 1985, yet real GNP grew by 
3.6 percent in that year. 
Internal Consistency 
An additional source of support for the BVAR model's 
forecast comes from using the model to check whether 
the median ASA-NBER real GNP growth forecast is 
consistent with the median ASA-NBER real consump-
tion growth forecast. This check can be made using a 
method known as conditional forecasting. A conditional 
forecast is, essentially, a "What if?" exercise. Such a 
forecast assumes that the BVAR model correctly 
describes the relationships among different macro-
economic variables. 
We can ask the BVAR model, for example, what real 
GNP growth forecast it would predict if it assumed 
that the median ASA-NBER real consumption growth 
forecast, rather than its own forecast of real consump-
tion growth, were correct. This real GNP growth 
forecast would then be the model's conditional forecast 
because it is conditioned on the ASA-NBER consump-
tion forecast. (The technical details of conditional 
forecasting with the BVAR model are discussed in the 
Appendix and in Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984.) 
I constructed a conditional forecast to check the 
internal consistency of the predictions made by the 
median ASA-NBER forecast. In this conditional fore-
cast, the BVAR model based its predictions on the 
median ASA-NBER forecast of consumption growth 
from the fourth quarter of 1989 until the fourth quarter 
of 1990. One way to see whether the median ASA-
NBER forecasts of real GNP growth and real consump-
tion growth are reasonable is to compare the BVAR 
model's conditional forecast of real GNP growth with 
the median ASA-NBER forecast of real GNP growth. 
Since the BVAR model's conditional forecast shows the 
most likely real growth of GNP (given the ASA-NBER 
median forecast of consumption growth), that condi-
tional forecast should be close to the ASA-NBER 
median real GNP growth forecast if the two ASA-
NBER forecasts are consistent. 
The BVAR model's conditional forecast predicts 
that real GNP growth would decline in 1990 if con-
sumption were to grow as slowly as predicted by the 
median ASA-NBER forecast. The model's conditional 
forecast calls for real GNP to fall by 0.2 percent from 
the fourth quarter of 19 89 to the fourth quarter of 1990. 
Since the median ASA-NBER forecast of real GNP 
growth in 1990 is 2.1 percent, that forecast and the 
conditional forecast differ substantially. Thus, if the 
BVAR model correctly captures the structure of the 
economy, it is unlikely that the ASA-NBER median 
forecasts of real consumption and real GNP growth are 
both correct. 
Forecast Accuracy 
One final source of support for the BVAR model's 
23 forecast is the accuracy of its previous forecasts. After 
the last major changes to the model were made in 1986, 
it has been more accurate, on average, in predicting 
both real growth and inflation than has the median 
ASA-NBER forecast. This greater accuracy can be 
seen by comparing the published four-quarter-ahead 
predictions of the BVAR model and the median ASA-
NBER forecast for real growth and inflation during the 
past three years with the initial announcements of those 
numbers. The comparison shows that the BVAR model 
was more accurate than the median ASA-NBER 
forecast two out of three times for each variable. It is not 
clear whether this accuracy is the result of good 
forecasting or good luck, but it provides some further 
support for the BVAR model's predictions. 
But Are We Certain? 
We have seen several kinds of evidence supporting the 
BVAR model's prediction that strong consumption 
growth will sustain the expansion for 1990-91. But, 
as with any prediction, the model's forecast could be 
wrong. 
Recent data suggest one reason that the forecast 
could be wrong. The model's interpretation of the cur-
rent weakness in real growth as an aberration could be 
incorrect. The model predicts that the weakness is 
an aberration, but other forecasters believe that the 
strength in real growth during the first three quarters of 
1989 was an aberration. The model differs from these 
other forecasts in predicting that the economy will 
return to moderately rapid real growth despite the weak 
growth in the fourth quarter of 1989, whereas other 
forecasters believe that the weak fourth-quarter growth 
shows that the trend rate of growth has fallen. It is quite 
possible that the other forecasters are right and that the 
model is overly optimistic. 
This uncertainty about how fast real GNP will grow 
next year suggests that it is important to assess how 
much uncertainty exists in the model's forecast. One 
significant feature of the BVAR model is that it can 
quantify the amount of uncertainty in its forecast from 
its own past forecast errors. The model estimates that 
the probability of a recession in 1990 and 1991 is about 
30 percent. (I use the standard definition of recession 
as two consecutive quarters of negative real growth.) 
Thus, even though the model predicts moderate growth 
and moderate inflation, it shows that there is still a 
modest chance of a recession. 
Even so, the model predicts that there is a smaller 
chance of a recession now than it predicted in 1984, 
after long-term interest rates rose 200 basis points, and 
in late 1987, after the October stock market crash.
3 
In both of those cases, short-term weakness in the econ-
omy was reversed and the recovery continued. The 
BVAR model predicts that this reversal will happen 
again and that the expansion will continue through 
1991. 
3Since 1982, the model's prediction of the probability of a recession within 
the next eight quarters has varied from 10 percent to almost 80 percent. 
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Appendix 
Conditional Forecasting With the BVAR Model 
This appendix explains how I use the Bayesian vector auto-
regression (BVAR) model of the U.S. economy to make 
conditional forecasts like the one described in the text. 
One long-unresolved problem with the national BVAR 
model is how to use it to make conditional projections of GNP 
and its components. The problem with making conditional 
forecasts based on these components arises because the mod-
el needs a way to reconcile the conflicting GNP forecasts 
made within the model. The complete model is composed of 
different sectors, which make their own forecasts. (For a 
description of the model's structure, see Litterman 1984.) 
But the GNP forecasts from the model's core sector will not 
usually be equal to the sum of the forecasts of the components 
of GNP made by the model's other sectors. Therefore, these 
differing forecasts must be reconciled. 
Unfortunately, this reconciliation of conflicting GNP fore-
casts within the model has, until now, made it impossible to 
use the model to make conditional forecasts based on as-
sumptions about the future path of real GNP or one of its 
components. Here I describe the method I used to solve this 
problem. 
Without Reconciliation 
In a simple BVAR model without different sectors or reconcil-
iation, conditional projection is easy. Assume, for example, 
that we have estimated the following model: 
(Al) Xt = AXt-i + e„ E(ee') = H 
where 
Xt = a vector of stationary random variables 
A = a matrix of regression coefficients 
et = a vector of innovations to Xt in time t. 
Assume that Xt has two components: X\ t and Also 
assume that 
(A2) ft= R °
lj\ . 
La21 a2 J 
Now suppose that after making a baseline forecast of the 
x's in period t+1 (denoted as ii^+i and *2,r+i)> we want to 
see what the model would have predicted for Jt2,H-i if *i,r+i 
were equal to X\ instead of X\tt+\ . We can determine that 





 could add a shock of (ii^+i — *i,r+i) to 
the first component in f +1. However, if we do that, we cannot 
assume that the forecast for X2j+\ will remain at i^f+i-
fact, the covariance matrix of the innovations implies that a 
one-unit shock to X\\ will, on average, be accompanied by 
a (<Ji2/ffi)-unit shock to *2,r+i- Therefore, the forecast of 
x2,t+1 > conditioned on jq^+i
 = 1 > should be 
(A3) x2,/+i =*2,r+l + (^12/^1)(*i,H-l -*l,r+l)-
From this description, it is easy to see that the correct-sized 
shock to change the forecast of jq from*!toil is 
extremely easy to determine. 
With Reconciliation 
It is not, however, so simple to determine the correct size of 
the shock with many variables in the current national BVAR 
model because the sectors' conflicting forecasts of those 
variables must be reconciled. If, for example, GNP in the core 
sector were shocked by $10 billion, the forecast of GNP for 
that period would not necessarily increase by $ 10 billion after 
the conflicting GNP forecasts were reconciled. 
I have developed a relatively simple method for using the 
national model to make forecasts conditioned on a particular 
path for GNP or a linear combination of its components. I 
solve for the conditional forecast by iteratively determining 
the proper shock to GNP in the model's core sector in each 
time period so that GNP (or a linear combination of its 
components) will follow a particular path. 
Suppose, for example, we wanted to see the effect on the 
model's overall forecast over the next year if GNP grew by 
$10 billion per month faster than its baseline forecast. We 
would start by shocking the core sector's value of GNP by 
some initial amount (probably larger than $10 billion) and 
shocking the nonfinancial variables in the core by that 
amount, scaled by the ratio of the covariance of the innovation 
in its equation with the innovation in GNP to the variance of 
GNP.
1 After making the revised one-step-ahead forecast for 
the core sector, we would make revised one-step-ahead 
!The financial variables (the three-month Treasury-bill interest rate, the 
value of the Standard & Poor's 500-Stock Price Index, and the foreign-
exchange value of the dollar) are not shocked because they are assumed to be 
exogenous with respect to GNP in a given month. This is made explicit in the 
national model by including contemporaneous values of the financial variables 
in the equations for the nonfinancial variables. 
25 forecasts for each of the other sectors, then reconcile those 
forecasts. 
Unfortunately, after the reconciliation, the new one-step-
ahead forecast for GNP would almost certainly not be 
$ 10 billion higher than the baseline forecast. Thus, we would 
need to search for the proper-sized shock to give to GNP 
in the core sector to create a reconciled forecast that was 
$10 billion larger than the baseline forecast. This shock can 
be determined iteratively with line-search algorithms used in 
maximum-likelihood estimation. After the correct shock for 
the first forecasting period is determined, we can then 
determine the correct shocks for GNP in the core in each 
subsequent period by using the same iterative method for each 
period, sequentially. This procedure then gives the model's 
forecast conditioned on a specific path for GNP. 
It is important to note that the shock to GNP in the core 
sector is assumed to be orthogonal to the innovations in the 
equations outside the core. At first glance, this assumption 
seems absurd, but it is reasonable because contemporaneous 
GNP is included as an independent variable in those other 
sectors.
2 Thus, by construction, the shock to GNP should be 
orthogonal to the shock to those equations because GNP is 
already included as an independent variable. 
Caveat 
Even though we now have a method for producing condi-
tional forecasts, we should be cautious in interpreting these 
forecasts. Miller and Roberds (1987) give evidence that con-
ditional forecasts may actually perform worse than uncon-
ditional forecasts because the structure of the economy 
changes in ways that a BVAR model cannot capture. 
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